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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DIAMOND T UTAH, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintif!-Appellant,

vs.
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
a corporation authorized to do
business in the State of Utah,
PACIFIC FINANCE, INC., a
corporation authorized to do
business in the State of Utah,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
10951

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, TRAVELERS
INDEMNITY COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action on a contract of insurance between
the plaintiff-appellant, Diamond T Utah, Inc., and the defendant-respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At pretrial defendant, Travelers Indemnity Company,
moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff and defendant Travelers stipulated that there was no material
issue of fact in the issue of liability on an insurance policy
and that the depositions herein be published and that all of
the written agreements of the parties hereto be made a part
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of the record herein. The Court entered an order upon the
stipulation and set a day for the submission of briefs and for
oral argument on defendant's motion. The plaintiff-appellant, Diamond T Utah, amended the pretrial order to include
a motion by it for summary judgment to be heard at the
same time as Travelers Indemnity Company's motion. The
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, heard the arguments of counsel and reviewed
the pleadings and published depositions herein as provided
in Rule 12 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and awarded to
the defendant, Travelers Indemnity Company, summary
judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against it
with prejudice and upon the merits of the complaint. (R.
111-112)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent, Travelers Indemnity Company,
seeks affirmation of the summary judgment of the District
Court entered in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As to the joined issues between Travelers Indemnity
Company, hereinafter referred to as Travelers, and Diamond T Utah, Inc., hereinafter ref erred to as Diamond
T, there is no material issue of fact concerning the
issue of coverage of risks provided in the insurance policy.
In the District Court, Travelers' motion to dismiss which
was treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule
12 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Diamond T's motion for summary judgment placed the construction of the
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written contract of insurance before the Court. That contract of insurance and the depositions of 0. J. Wilkinson, the
president and owner of all of the shares of stock, except for
"qualifiers for incorporation" (R-152), of the plaintiff corporation, contain all of the agreements upon which the plaintiff relies by stipulation between Diamond T and Travelers
and by the order of the District Court entered upon said
stipulation (R-38). Between Diamond T and Travelers the
only disputed issue of fact is the value of the tractor-trailer.
Diamond T cannot create an issue of fact concerning the
coverage of the contract of insurance between Diamond T
and Travelers on appeal which is the gravamen of Diamond
T's complaint against Travelers. Mastic Tile v. Acme Distributing Co., 15 U.2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 (1964) ; Richards v.
Anderson, 9U.2d17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959).
Travelers does not disagree with the facts in the statement of facts in Diamond T's brief. Travelers submits that
Diamond T does not limit its argument to its statement of
facts, the record in the case at bar and the pleadings in this
case. All of the declarations of purported facts by Diamond
T in its argument must not be considered as material issues
of fact under this Court's decision in Mastic Tile v. Acme
Distributing Co. and Richards v. Anderson, supra. For the
Court's convenience Travelers submits further uncontested
material facts omitted from Diamond T's brief with a restatement of the facts in appellant's brief as necessary for
clarity.
Diamond T and Travelers entered into a contract of
insurance. (R-181) The contract of insurance contained an
"automobile dealer's endorsement". (R-184) The endorsement in part provides :
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"It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded
by the policy applies subject to the following provisions:
"l. Property Covered--The policy covers automobiles (a) consigned to or owned by the insured and
held for sale or used in the insured's business as an
automobile dealer including repair service or as
demonstrators, exclusive of automobiles leased or
rented to others, and automobiles sold by the insured
under bailment lease, conditional sale, purchase
agreement, mortgage or other encumbrance; ..."
(Emphasis added)

"INTERESTS AND AUTOMOBILES INCLUDED

Insured's Interest Only

New
Automobiles

Used
Automobiles

No

Yes"

The policy then describes the sales locations of the
dealers. The policy provides certain conditions for "unnamed
locations". Attached to the "automobile dealer's endorsement" is an automobile dealer's "drive-away" collision coverage endorsement which places certain limitations and conditions upon the transportation of the automobiles covered
by the policy. (R 184-186)
The policy did not become effective until January 27,
1961, which is the first day of the policy period defined in
paragraph VII as follows :
"This policy applies only to direct and accidental
losses to the automobile which are sustained during
the policy period ... " (R. 181, 182)
Before the commencement of the policy period, Dia-
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mond T sold a 1952 trailer and a 1953 tractor to David
Scott under a written conditional sales contract dated the
23rd day of January, 1961. (R-146)
On the same day, January 23, 1961, Diamond T assigned
its interest in the contract to Pacific Finance Company,
hereinafter called Pacific. (R-148)
Pacific and Diamond T had an agreement (R-148)
wherein it was provided:
". . . I (Diamond T) agree that if the assignee
shall repossess said property for failure of the purchaser to perform any of the conditions of said contract (conditional sales contract), and shall deliver
said property to my (Diamond T's) place of business
within (90) days after the due date of the oldest unpaid installment ... per contract, I will pay the balance remaining under said contract within thirty
(30) days after delivery, or on demand at election of
assignee.... I (Diamond T) understand that title
to said property remains in the assignee (Pacific)
until the contract balance shall be fully paid ..."
In the conditional sales contract and in an agreement to
furnish insurance, Diamond T, Pacific and the conditional
purchaser agreed to cause insurance covering "fire, theft and
physical damage" to the tractor and trailer. (R-146, 147,
148) In the conditional sales contract the purchaser, Scott,
promised to cause insurance coverage for said property
damage or theft. (R-146) The insurance coverage provided
by the conditional sales contract was purchased. (R-22,
23) That insurance against fire, theft and physical damage
was not in force at the time of loss because of non-payment
of premium. (R-23)
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The conditional purchaser, David Scott, was in default
on the conditional sales contract on or about June 16, 1961.
On that date Pacific took possession of the tractor-trailer at
Madison, Wisconsin. Pacific caused the tractor-trailer to be
parked outside a garage in Madison. Scott, the conditional
purchaser, found the tractor-trailer. Taking advantage of an
opportunity, he took possession of it. A few days later the
tractor-trailer was found at the location of an accident in
which it had been involved. (R-12, 22 and 23)
Concerning the "repossession" of the tractor-trailer by
Pacific and in reference to the "assignment agreement" between Pacific and Diamond T, Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson testified
at his deposition that Pacific was vested with legal title and
David Scott was vested with equitable title up until the time
the tractor-trailer was involved in the accident which caused
the damage for which Diamond T complains. He said:
"And they (Pacific Finance) secured the truck
from a driver, repossessed it from his driver. (R163,
line 6)
"The following day he (David Scott, purchaser)
called me. (R-163, line 12)
"As I remember he did not have enough money
to pay it up to date in full and so I told him he would
have to go to Pacific Finance and work out whatever he wanted to do with them and that would be
the only way that the truck could be released, that I
would not release it and could not release it, and that
it was up to Pacific Finance to handle it. (R-163 and
164)
"They (Pacific Finance) just called me and told
me they had picked it (tractor-trailer) up and it was
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stored in-I don't remember, some little town in Wisconsin ... that their office (Pacific's) was mailing
the keys and all, their storage receipt and everything
to them (Pacific in Salt Lake City) here. And I told
them, well, when they (Pacific) got that then I
would go ahead and make arrangements to have it
picked up.
"Q. After ... the., truck had been taken, ... do
you know if Pacific Finance took any further steps
to locate the units?

"A. Yes ... " (R-165)
Diamond T claims the loss of the tractor-trailer sold by
Diamond T under a conditional sales contract to David Scott
was covered by Travelers' policy (R-11-14).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE BETWEEN
TRAVELERS AND DIAMOND T DID NOT COVER
THE LOSS OF THE TRACTOR-TRAILER BECAUSE
THE TERMS OF SAID POLICY EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED "AUTOMOBILES ... SOLD BY THE INSURED UNDER ... CONDITIONAL SALE"
The provision in Travelers' "automobile dealer's endorsement" which provided:
"l. Property Covered. The policy covers auto-

mobiles * * * * exclusive of automobiles * * * * sold
by insured under * * * conditional sale."
excluded coverage of the tractor-trailer sold to David Scott
under the conditional sales contract.
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The language of the clause in Travelers' policy has been
construed in several decisions including two cases involving
repossessed automobiles. 23 ALR2d 796, 3 ALR2d Later
Case Service 578 and page 62, 1967 Supplement.
In Hudiberg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co.,
(Texas) 383 S.W.2d 65 (1964) the same language in an
automobile dealer's policy was an issue. In that case the
plaintiff, automobile dealer, had possession of a truck which
had been repossessed from the dealer's conditional purchaser. The dealer had assigned its interest in the truck
under the conditional sales contract to GMAC shortly after
the conditional sale. GMAC had repossessed the truck from
the conditional purchaser and delivered it to the dealer. The
conditional purchaser stealthily took possession of the
truck from the dealer by use of his extra set of keys. The
dealer apparently had a dealer's agreement with GMAC.
The dealer paid GMAC the balance the conditional purchaser
owed on the contract. In reversing the trial court's judgment
for the plaintiff the Court said:
"Vehicles insured . . . (by the policy) were
those' (a) consigned to or owned by the insured and
held for sale or used in the insured's business as an
automobile dealer * * * * exclusive of automobiles
* * * sold by the insured under * * * mortgage, conditional sale * *'

* * * *

"(T) he truck did not * * become in any sense a
vehicle 'consigned to or owned by the insured' much
less one which was 'held for sale or used in the in·
sured's business'. Furthermore, the vehicle in question was encumbered ... The insured's loss was not
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contemplated to be covered nor was it the subject of
insurance afforded by the policy."
In Meyer v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. (Texas)
383 S.W.2d 625 (1964) the contract of insurance between
the plaintiff and defendant contained the same language as
the contract of insurance in the case at bar. It was an automobile dealer's policy. The Court found that the dealer had
sold the automobile under a conditional sales contract. The
conditional purchaser damaged the automobile. The dealer
repossessed the automobile, repaired it and sold it to another. The dealer claimed that he was entitled under the insurance policy to recover the amount of damage to the automobile. The court held that the automobile was sold under a
conditional sale and thereby excluded from coverage of the
dealer's policy.

In Ohio Security Insurance Co. v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co. (Ohio) 178 N.E.2d 817 (1962) two insurance carriers sought a declaratory judgment concerning their liabilities under insurance policies. The defendant, Buckeye Union
Casualty Company, had an automobile dealer's contract of
insurance with an automobile dealer named Midtown Motors.
The language of the exclusion of property covered in that
policy was the same as the language in the Travelers' policy
in the case at bar. Midtown Motors and the purchaser had
executed a note and mortgage for the purchase of the automobile. The purchaser was given possession of the automobile. Midtown Motors had not complied with Ohio's Automobile Title Act for divesting itself of title. The automobile
sustained damage while in possession of the purchaser. The
Court held that Buckeye Union Casualty Insurance Company
was not liable on its dealer's policy and said:
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"(T) o hold the automobile was not sold under
mortgage within the meaning of the language of the
exclusion clause would just simply be contrary to
common right and reason."
The exclusion from coverage of the tractor-trailer sold
by Diamond T under a conditional sale to David Scott is
consistent with all of the provisions of the "automobile dealer's endorsement".
The language of the automobile dealer's endorsement
compels the conclusion that the parties to the insurance contract contemplated that the policy covered loss by physical
damage and theft of automobiles while "held for sale" by the
dealer, the insured.
The coverage commenced when the automobile dealer
took possession of automobiles as consignee or purchaser
and owned and held the automobiles for sale to others. Vol.
11 Couch on Insurance 2d §42 :238 p. 75. The protection
against loss continued until the dealer sold and delivered
possession to a purchaser whether the sale was absolute or
conditional. 23 ALR2d 796; 11 Couch on Insurance 2d
§42 :238 p. 74.
The condition precedent to coverage of the risk of loss
of an automobile under the insurance contract was that the
automobile be "held for sale" by the dealer. The condition
precedent of possession by the dealer, insured, was limited
to two categories of possession by the dealer, to-wit: (1)
possession as consignee, or (2) possession as owner even
though the automobile was subject to a "trust agreement,
bailment, lease, conditional sale, purchase agreement, mortgage" between the dealer and the person, firm or corpora-
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tion from whom the automobile dealer may have purchased
the automobile or with whom the automobile dealer may
have financed his purchase of the automobile.
The requirements in the policy for the insured's designating locations of the places the automobiles are held for
sale, for permitting the insurer to inspect the insured's
books and for limiting the conditions and distances of transporting the automobiles, emphasize the kind of coverage the
automobile dealer was purchasing and the basis of the premium charge he paid. They were consistent with coverage of
automobiles "held for sale" but not consistent with automobiles sold and delivered to a purchaser.
There was nothing in the insurance policy which indicated that the parties contemplated that the tractor-trailer
sold to David Scott before the commencement of the policy
period was "property covered" by the policy. The decisions
construing the language of a "dealer's policy" under circumstances similar to those in the case at bar unanimously hold
that a policy with the same provisions as Travelers' policy
in the case at bar did not cover automobiles as the tractortrailer sold to David Scott.
In Diamond T's brief to this Court some hornbook
phrases concerning the interpretation of insurance contracts
are paraphrased. Diamond T fails to apply the undisputed
facts to those principles. In this case the ordinary and natural meaning of the language used should not be perverted or
twisted into an unnatural or exceptional meaning merely to
cause coverage. Vol. 3 Couch §15: 49 p. 738. Especially when
eradication of the exclusion of automobiles sold and in possession of persons other than the insured would obviously
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have escalated the amount of premium at the time the parties
entered into the insurance contract.
POINT II
TRAVELERS' CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WITH
DIAMOND T ONLY COVERED AUTOMOBILES
"CONSIGNED TO OR OWNED BY THE INSURED
AND HELD FOR SALE." DIAMOND T DID NOT
HAVE ANY POSSESSION OF OR INTEREST IN
THE TRACTOR-TRAILER WHEN IT WAS REPOSSESSED BY PACIFIC OR WHEN THE TRACTOR-TRAILER SUSTAINED DAMAGE.

0. J. Wilkinson, president and practically sole owner of
Diamond T testified at his deposition that when Diamond T
sold the tractor-trailer to David Scott under the conditional
sales contract, Diamond T assigned all of its seller's interest
in said contract to Pacific. After Diamond T's complete
divestiture of any interest in the vehicle, Pacific received
all of the payments Scott made under the conditional sales
contract. (R-146, 148, 161) Pacific repossessed the tractortrailer as holder of legal title. Pacific did not reassign the
seller's interest in the conditional sales contract to Diamond
T nor did Diamond T obtain possession of the tractor-trailer
prior to its damage. (R-164)
After Diamond T assigned all of its interest in the conditional sales contract it had no interest in the property. In
American States Insurance Co. v. White, et al, 341 Ill. App.
Ct. Rpts. 422, 94 N.E.2d 95 (1950) the plaintiff insurance
company claimed that it had no liability under its insurance
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policy on the ground that the insured was not the owner of
the automobile. In considering the effect of a bill of sale by a
conditional seller executed after the conditional seller had
assigned its interest in a conditional sales contract to GMAC
for the same automobile the Court reasoned:
"Furthermore, if the alleged bill of sale were
executed after Rock River Motors (conditional seller) assigned the conditional sales contract to GMAC,
it was, a fortiori, a nullity, for then Rock River
Motors (conditional seller) would not have even had
the right to receive the balance of payment for the
car."
This Court has decided in Stains v. Peterson, 74 U. 256,
279 P. 53 (1929) and in Harrison v. Otto Securities Co., 70
U. 11, 257 P. 677 (1927), that an assignment of the conditional seller's interest in a conditional sales contract transfers all of the conditional seller's rights in the property sold
under the conditional sales contract. After the assignment of
the conditional seller's interest the rights in the property are
exclusively vested in the conditional purchaser and the
assignee of the conditional seller.
The agreement between Pacific and Diamond T did not
give Diamond T any interest in the property before its loss.
Pacific may have elected to proceed under several conditions of the contract, none of which would vest an interest
in the tractor-trailer in Diamond T before the loss for which
plaintiff complains. Pacific and Diamond T expressly agreed
in their agreement as follows:
"I (Diamond T) understand that title to said
property remains in the assignee (Pacific) until the
contract balance shall be fully paid...."
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It is undisputed that Diamond T did not pay the contract balance to Pacific nor have possession of the tractortrailer before the accident in which the vehicle was damaged.
In its brief Diamond T irrelevantly and erroneously
argues that it had an insurable interest in the tractor-trailer.
The issue in this case is whether that interest, if any, was
insured.
The decisions cited by the attorney for Diamond T in its
brief have no relationship whatsoever to the issues at bar.
In Fish v. Connecticut Fire Insurance Co. (Wisc.) 5 N.W.2d
779 (1942) the policy of insurance had different provisions
from the one in the case at bar and the plaintiff, insured,
owned the chattel. In Pratt v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. (R.I.)
146 A. 763 (1929) the insurance policy insured the conditional vendor, the conditional vendee and the assignee of the
conditional vendee. In that case the insurance policy specifically provided that all three were named insureds. The provisions of the policy in that case were completely different
from the conditions in the policy in the case at bar. The policy
in that case was the kind of policy Diamond T, Pacific and
Scott agreed to furnish, and did purchase; but they permitted
it to lapse for nonpayment of premium before the loss. In
Union Insurance Society v. Sudduth (Ala.) 103 S. 845 (1925)
the record revealed that the conditional seller was named in
the "encumbrance" clause of a policy which had completely
different provisions from the dealer's policy in the case at
bar. In Hassett v. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. (Wash.)
273 P. 745 (1929) the plaintiff, insured, purchased a policy
insuring him against "all direct loss or damage which he
may sustain by the disposal or concealment of said automobile by the said vendee with intent to defraud the said
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vendor" which is apparently what caused the loss of the
property sold to said vendee in that case. The decisions in
Germania Fire Insurance Co. v. Turley, (Ky.) 179 S.W.
1059 (1915) and Home Insurance Co. v. Chowning (Ky.)
233 S.E. 731 (1921) involved fire insurance policies covering damage to real property. In both of those cases the insurance policies were completely different from the insurance policy in the case at bar.
The appellant's attorney in Diamond T's brief does cite
a case which is almost in point and which is helpful to the
defendant, Travelers. That decision is Fountain v. Importers
and Exporters Insurance Co. of New York, (Wisc.) 252
N.W. 569 (1934). In that case a conditional seller of automobiles assigned his interest in conditional sales contracts
after the conditional purchasers took possession of the
automobiles sold under the contracts. The conditional seller,
Fountain, had a contract of insurance with the defendant
insurance company which expressly covered automobiles
subject to an equitable mortgage. Conditional purchasers of
some automobiles had apparently defaulted on their contracts of conditional sale. The automobiles had been repossessed and they were held for sale on Fountain's lot. A
fire destroyed the automobiles. The trial court found that
Fountain, the automobile dealer, had an insurable interest
in the repossessed cars. The Court reversed the judgment of
the trial court. In connection with the automobile dealer's
insurable interest, the Court said:
"As to the . . . repossessed cars, we are of the
opinion that, under the evidence as it stands, it does
not appear that Fountain (auto dealer) had an in-urnble interest therein. * * * * Fleming (assignee)
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kept an account respecting each of the cars (which)
shows that four of the repossessed cars were settled
for and paid for by Fountain (dealer) when they
were sold. From this alone the inference would be
that Fountain had no further interests in a car after
it was sold, and Fleming's (assignee's) charge
against him therefor was fully paid. The ownership
in a car after it was sold was no longer in Fountain
(dealer), but in the purchaser. Fleming's (assignee's) lien thereon remained, for he held the sale
papers and kept the certificate of title in his possession after having the sale recorded in the Secretary
of State's office, and the right to repossess it for
breach of conditions of sale was in Fleming (assignee), not Fountain (dealer)."
Diamond T did not have an insurable interest in the
tractor-trailer purchased by David Scott under the Fountain
decision cited by appellant in its brief. The record and
decisions cited by Travelers compel the conclusion that Diamond T did not have an interest in the tractor-trailer sold
to David Scott after its assignment to Pacific. Diamond T
had completely divested itself of any interest in that property. It did not become vested with any interest before the
time of loss. And, more significantly, the tractor-trailer was
not an "automobile consigned to or owned by the insured
and held for sale" as proscribed by the insurance policy.
POINT III
THE TRACTOR-TRAILER PURCHASED BY DAVID
SCOTT WAS SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONAL
SALES CONTRACT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IN WHICH THE TRACTOR-TRAILER SUSTAINED DAMAGE AND WITHIN THE EXCLU-
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SION OF "AUTOMOBILES SOLD UNDER CONDITIONAL SALE" IN TRAVELERS' POLICY.
The conditional sales contract under which Diamond T
sold the tractor-trailer to David Scott provided for seller's
remedies in case of default by the conditional purchaser.
The "seller" at the time of loss was .Pacific as assignee of
all of the Diamond T's rights in the contract. (R-146) Under
the contract Pacific could repossess the chattel and sell the
chattel at a public or a private sale. It could apply the proceeds of the sale on the balance owing on the contract and
claim any deficiency from the conditional purchaser or pay
to the purchaser the amount of the proceeds from said sale
in excess of the balance owing on the contract. Those provisions gave the purchaser an interest which has not terminated. Correlative to the seller's contract right to repossess
and sell the chattel is the duty to obtain a reasonable value
for the chattel which must be applied on the balance owing
by the purchaser.
The conditional sales contract permitted the purchaser
to pay the entire balance owing which would vest him with
both legal and equitable title in the chattel and divest any
right of Pacific in the chattle.
None of the rights of Pacific and Scott were extinguished prior to the accident in which the tractor-trailer
sustained damage.
In Jones v. Brown, (Ga.) 134 S.W.2d 440 (1963) the
legal title holder repossessed the chattel from the plaintiff
and sold it to a third party. The legal title holder subsequently accepted a late payment from the plaintiff. After
the late payment was accepted, plaintiff sued for possession
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of the chattel. In discussing the rights of the equitable
owner, plaintiff, under the contract the Court said:
"The plaintiff at the time of the institution of
this suit did not have legal title, but she did have a
special property interest entitling her to pursue the
action, which was the value of the goods over and
above the amount of the debt. She did not have a
right to recover the property itself without paying
the debt (which she could have done by a prior
tender of the amount due, or during the trial at the
time of electing a property judgment) or she could
recover on the basis of the special property right by
electing a money judgment for the difference. * * * *

* * * *
"The owner of property who conveys by a bill of
sale to secure a debt owing by him to a creditor is
in the same legal situation as one who purchases
property from a vendor who retains title until the
purchase price is paid; in both situations the right of
possession depends upon compliance with the terms
of the contract."
In an action to recover a deficiency on a conditional
sales contract after sale of the repossessed automobile sold
under the contract this Court decided in Jens en's Used Cars
v. Rice 7 U.2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1958) that a contract as
the conditional sales contract in the case at bar continues
until the judgment for deficiency and other contractual
obligations expressed in said contract unless the parties
agree upon a modification prior to judgment.
The insurance policy in the case at bar excluded automobiles sold by conditional sale. The conditional sales contract for the tractor-trailer in the case at bar continues to be

19
binding upon the parties to it and their assignees. The
tractor-trailer was not property covered by the insurance
policy at the time of its loss.
POINT IV
DIAMOND T EITHER ASSIGNED ITS INTEREST
IN THE CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT TO
PACIFIC OR IT DID NOT ASSIGN ITS INTEREST.
IF IT DID NOT ASSIGN ITS INTEREST THERE
WAS NO REPOSSESSION. IF THERE WAS NO REPOSSESSION, THE TRACTOR-TRAILER WAS
STILL UNDER THE CONDITIONAL SALE AT THE
TIME OF LOSS. IF IT ASSIGNED ITS INTEREST
IT HAD NO INTEREST. IN EITHER EVENT,
TRAVELERS' POLICY DID NOT COVER THE
LOSS.
Diamond T is caught in a dilemma. If it did not assign
its interest in the conditional sales contract to Pacific Finance thereby causing Pacific to be vested with legal title,
Pacific had no right to receive the payments from David
Scott and it had no right to repossess the tractor-trailer.
The repossession by Pacific would not have been a valid
repossession. If there were no repossession David Scott
would still be the conditional purchaser entitled to drive it
away from the place it was parked by Pacific in Madison,
Wisconsin. The Travelers' policy would not cover the risk of
loss of the tractor-trailer because the tractor-trailer was sold
under a conditional sales contract as provided in the exclusion of "property covered" phrase in the policy. On the
other hand, if Diamond T assigned its interest in the tractor-
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trailer to Pacific, Diamond T did not have any interest in
the tractor-trailer at the time of loss. All of the decisions are
unanimous.
In Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co.
(Tex.) 383 S.W.2d 65 (1964) the seller assigned all of his
interest in an automobile to the finance company, GMAC,
which repossessed the automobile from the purchaser and
delivered it to the dealer from whose possession the purchaser surreptitiously took the automobile and damaged it.
The dealer paid GMAC the balance owing on the contract.
The Court held that a "dealer's policy" only insured vehicular property and the dealer had no interest in the lost automobile. The cases annotated at 23 ALR2d and 3 ALR2d
Later Case Service p. 578 unanimously hold that an insurance policy as Travelers' policy does not cover property sold
under conditional sale.
POINT V
DIAMOND T'S UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTEE
WAS A CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY NOT COVERED BY TRAVELERS' "AUTOMOBILE DEALER'S ENDORSEMENT."
The record clearly indicates that the parties in this
litigation did not contemplate that Travelers' "dealer's endorsement" covered any liability of Diamond T on its unconditional guarantee of its conditional purchaser's obligations to its assignee, Pacific. Pacific and Diamond T made
provision for other insurance covering sold automobiles in
which Pacific and possibly Diamond T would have been
named as a loss payee in the policy. (R-147) There was such
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a policy covering the tractor-trailer but it lapsed prior to
the loss.
Under Travelers' "dealer's endorsement" the only
coverage provided Diamond T was loss of an interest in
automobiles which it "held for sale as owner'' and which had
not been sold and delivered under a contract of conditional
sale. The fact that the insured, Diamond T, had contractually obligated itself to make payment to Pacific if a conditional purchaser failed to make payment to Pacific had no
effect on the liability of Travelers under the policy. Travelers insured Diamond T against loss of property not against
its contractual liability to Pacific. Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Globe Indemnity (Tex.) 383 S.W.2d 65 (1964)
CONCLUSION
Travelers' "dealer's endorsement" and policy did not
insure Diamond T against the loss of the tractor-trailer it
sold under conditional sale to David Scott. Summary judgment for Travelers against Diamond T should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
L. RIDD LARSON
Attorneys for Travelers Indemnity
Company
Defendant and Respondent

